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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary provides a summary of prevailing
environmental decisions decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit since the last issue of the William
and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. It does not
cover every environmental decision of the Fourth Circuit during
that time period, but only those cases which the editors believe to
be of the most interest to our subscribers.
NEPA
Fair Woods Homeowners Ass'n v. Pena, No. 95-1155, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 47
(4th Cir. Jan. 3, 1996).
The Fair Woods Homeowners Association ("Fair Woods") maintains a
residential development in Fairfax County, Virginia. In 1981, the Federal Highway
Administration ("FHWA") and the Virginia Department of Transportation
("VDOT") completed a draft environmental impact statement ("EIS") for the
Fairfax County Parkway. The Virginia State Highway and Transportation
Commission approved the location of the parkway in that year, but specific design
features such as interchanges were not approved until 1987. When Fair Woods was
incorporated in 1983, the developer of Fair Woods was on notice of the proposed
parkway because Fairfax County required the developer to dedicate thirteen acres
of the property for a right of way. Additionally, there was evidence that at least one
Fair Woods resident was aware of the proposed parkway when he bought his house.
The final EIS for the parkway was approved in 1984. It did not include the
Fair Woods development as a site where noise barriers were to be constructed. In
1993, VDOT published the list of communities that would receive noise barriers
and later denied Fair Woods' request for noise barriers on the grounds that the
development did not exist at the "point of public knowledge" which, according to
VDOT, was the date the parkway received location approval in 1981.
In 1994, VDOT began construction of a highway interchange which would
bring traffic within 100 feet of homes in the Fair Woods development. Fair Woods
brought an action against the Secretary of the Departmentof Transportation
("DOT"), the Administrator of the FHWA, and the Commissioner of VDOT,
seeking a declaratory order that these agencies had failed to study the noise impact
of the interchange and possible noise abatement measures as required by the
Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 109, and the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. In response, VDOT conducted a study of
the future noise impact of the parkway on the Fair Woods development, and FHWA
reevaluated the EIS for the parkway in consideration of the new data. FHWA
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concluded that the responsibility for the noise impacts did not rest on federal aid
highway funds, but on the Fairfax County authorities and the developer, who were
fully aware of the parkway and located Fair Woods with that knowledge.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a
temporary restraining order barring construction of the interchange. After a change
of venue, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia dissolved the restraining order, concluding that construction of the
interchange would not cause Fair Woods irreparable harm because noise barriers
could be installed at a later time. The district court found that Fair Woods claims
under NEPA were barred by the equitable doctrine of laches because the
''community was put on sufficient and adequate notice that this particular highway
.. was going in."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling. The invocation
of the doctrine of laches lies within the sound discretion of the district court and can
only be reversed if clearly erroneous. Laches is an affirmative defense which
requires the defendant to prove: (1) lack of diligence by the plaintiff, and (2)
prejudice to the defendant. The Court of Appeals determined that Fair Woods
received clear notice of the proposed interchange in 1987 and knew at that time that
the development was not going to receive noise abatement measures. Because the
Court of Appeals found that Fair Woods' seven-year delay in filing suit was
"inexcusable and unreasonable," the "[d]efendants [did] not have to demonstrate
the degree of prejudice required if the delay had been less aggravated." Moreover,
Fair Woods' action prejudiced the defendants "by requiring the agencies to
reexamine the environmental data ten years after the final EIS was released for
public inspection and comment."
In addition, the Court of Appeals commented that even if Fair Woods
received the relief it sought, "its position would be no different than before it
commenced this litigation" because further environmental study under NEPA
would be superfluous. Defendants did not dispute that the noise would harm Fair
Woods but simply contended that they were not required to pay to alleviate that
problem. The court agreed with FHWA that the responsibility for noise abatement
measures laid with the Fairfax County authorities and the developer.
NUISANCE
Ogden v. Star Enterprise, No. 94-2488, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 33686 (4th Cir.
Dec. 4, 1995).
In Adams v. Star Enterprise, 51 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995), the Court of
Appeals affirmed a ruling that landowners could not receive damages for
speculative harm to their property from an oil spill near their property. See Fourth
Circuit Summary, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 171 (1995). This case
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arose from the same facts. Plaintiffs sought damages for personal injuries and
alleged contamination of their property by the spill under several tort theories
(nuisance, trespass, negligence, ultrahazardous activity, civil conspiracy, and
violation of state water quality law). The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that a
reasonable trier of fact could not return a verdict in the plaintiffs' favor.
In 1990, residents learned of an oil spill from a tank farm near their
property. The Environmental Protection Agency and Environmental Science &
Engineering, Inc., monitored and remediated the underground petroleum "plume"
and determined a precise location for the plume. Plaintiffs' home is nearly a
quarter of a mile from the nearest boundary of the plume.
The court determined that this evidence alone would preclude recovery
under Adams. In Adams, the court held that plaintiffs can recover only if they show
that their property was actually contaminated or that they suffered actual physical
harm. "Neither fear of harm nor diminution in property value resulting from mere
proximity to the plume is enough." In this case, the plaintiffs' evidence of harm
was "but a scintilla, if that." Plaintiffs noticed a rainwater puddle with an oily
sheen on it, but they did not take a sample of the oily puddle which never
reappeared. In addition, plaintiffs did not present a qualified medical expert to link
their ailments (a skin problem and nasal congestion) to the plume. For these
reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's summary judgment
ruling.
1996]
